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A PRIVATE SECURITY SOLUTION TO SOMALI PIRACY?
The U.S. Call for Private Security Engagement and the
Implications for Canada
Christopher Spearin
Canada’s naval response to Somali piracy has been a mixed affair. On the pos-itive side, in recent years the Canadian Navy has successfully dedicated a sig-
nificant level of resources to countering Somali piracy: the destroyer HMCS
Iroquois, the frigates HMCS Calgary, Ville de Québec, Winnipeg, and Fredericton,
and the oiler HMCS Protecteur. Collectively, these vessels operated effectively
alongside the ships of several other navies, especially those of the U.S. Navy, that
together form the various international flotillas confronting Somali pirates. The
Canadian Navy’s level of involvement has been no mean task, because of the
great distances involved, its limited number of surface combatants, and its other
responsibilities.
On the negative side, the effective handling of Somali pirates has been an
ephemeral and problematic task. Despite the international naval presence, the
incidence of Somali piracy has increased. In 2008 pirates attacked 122 vessels,
and in 2009 the number rose to 198. In the spring of 2010, just as HMCS Freder-
icton was cruising back to Halifax, Nova Scotia, after completing a 4.5-month
patrol, Somali pirates renewed their attacks following the monsoon season.1
Fredericton’s captain, Commander Steve Waddell, recognized the elusiveness of
overall success: “Pirates continue to attack shipping in the region. . . . [T]hey’ve
been doing it while we are here, and they continue to
do it now even as we get ready to go home.”2
In light of the counterpiracy mission’s prominence
for Canada and the limited effect navies have had so
far, a call by the United States for international
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commercial shippers to rely upon private security companies (PSCs) demands
attention. For instance, Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, “double-hatted” as com-
mander of the Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command, has advised that
“companies don’t think twice about using security guards to protect their valu-
able facilities ashore. Protecting valuable ships and their crews at sea is no differ-
ent.”3 General David Petraeus, then commander of U.S. Central Command,
similarly espoused the engagement of PSCs by international shippers operating
near Somalia.4 Though Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter
Natynczyk, has not explicitly endorsed the U.S. call, he has argued that pirates
who “see some challenge” will back off: “There’s a responsibility on the shipping
companies in terms of where they are routing ships and the kind of protection
they take, and it’s an issue they have to resolve because what we have found is
that the pirates are not a bunch of courageous people.”5
What, therefore, are the call’s implications in terms of future Canadian activ-
ism and the overall effectiveness of countering Somali piracy? To answer this
question, this article offers four main points. First, through initially examining
the rationales supporting Canada’s counterpiracy activities, it identifies the co-
nundrum that PSC/shipper engagement presents to Canada. The call’s Ameri-
can roots suggest boundaries on what Canada should likely expect in terms of
future U.S. Navy efforts and, correspondingly, the efficacy of a counterpiracy ap-
proach stressing mostly state assets (i.e., naval ships). Second, the article com-
pares the differences between a state naval (i.e., Canadian) counterpiracy
response to that of PSCs. It finds that though PSCs can avoid many of the prob-
lems that state responses currently confront, their engagement presents some
qualitative challenges. Third, the article identifies the Montreux Document on
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (to
which we will refer as the Montreux Document) as an appropriate device that
Canada might advance to ameliorate the maritime PSC option. Finally, the arti-
cle argues that while, quantitatively, more interactions between PSCs and ship-
pers might result through the Montreux Document’s promotion, many
commercial shippers do not wish to respond to the American recommendation;
it upsets long-held expectations about who does what at sea. Increasing the PSC
presence to such an extent that a strong public/private partnership at sea exists
will be a longer-term undertaking.
CANADIAN RATIONALES FOR COUNTERING SOMALI PIRACY
Five rationales frame the Canadian Navy’s efforts in countering Somali piracy.
One concerns the negative effects that piracy poses to maritime trade in both
holistic and, in turn, direct ways for Canada. At the holistic level, the Canadian
S P E A R I N 5 7
NWCR_Autumn2010-Spearin.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Thursday, August 19, 2010 1:25:50 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 4, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss4/8
Navy’s 2001 guiding document Leadmark and the government’s 2008 Canada
First Defence Strategy set the direction for the nation’s policy. They link Canada’s
economic prosperity as a trading nation with globalization, which in turn de-
pends on advancing stability and limiting lawlessness abroad.6 The Canadian
Navy’s assessment of important future strategic issues similarly stresses main-
taining this prosperity:
The greater interdependence of economies resulting from globalisation means that
great harm can be inflicted upon the economy and people of Canada by even
low-level warfare or asymmetric threats virtually anywhere in the world. . . . It is
therefore in the best interests of Canada to assist in ensuring the free flow of goods
and the creation and maintenance of an environment free of disruptions and threats
not only to us but also to our trading partners.7
Likewise in a direct manner—for instance, Somali pirates seized control of the
MV Yasa Neslihan on 29 October 2008. This Turkish-flagged bulk carrier held
seventy-seven thousand metric tons of Canadian iron ore and was en route to
China. Canadian naval personnel have also acknowledged the importance of the
Gulf of Aden to commercial vessels bound to Canada.8
The second rationale pertains to the physical security of Canadians. The Ca-
nadian government asserts that a variety of security concerns, regardless of geo-
graphical proximity, can pose a threat. To justify the government’s 2009 dispatch
of HMCS Winnipeg to the Gulf of Aden to counter Somali piracy, Defence Min-
ister Peter MacKay contended that “the security challenges facing Canada are
real and globalization means that developments abroad can have a profound im-
pact on the safety and interests of Canadians here.” The minister’s language ech-
oed the government’s stance laid out in the Canada First Defence Strategy.9
Third, in a political sense, Canadian involvement in counterpiracy efforts
demonstrates a commitment to responsible and meaningful participation in in-
ternational security endeavors. Political calculations intrude here, given the cur-
rent government’s desire to portray its Canada First Defence Strategy as reversing
the decline of international activism precipitated by preceding governments.
For Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the strategy “[ensures] that Canada can re-
turn to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do
its part.”10 In this context, Canada demonstrates leadership by “being there,”
which in turn helps to avert strategic marginalization felt by nonparticipants.
Canada also demonstrates leadership through its seeking out and acceptance of
prominent roles within international military activities.11
The fourth rationale is that historically the Canadian Navy has generally par-
ticipated in international naval activities headed by the U.S. Navy (USN). Put
differently, though the Canadian Navy certainly does not disregard independent
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operations or participation in coalitional activities lacking American leadership,
it does link much of its operational fortunes to the U.S. Navy. As Leadmark’s
drafters note, “There will continue to arise any number of situations in which
naval forces of medium powers such as Canada can make a difference by work-
ing in combination with the USN.”12
Therefore, the Canadian Navy’s long-standing interoperability with the U.S.
Navy allows for the contemplation of a range of operations that feature the lat-
ter’s involvement.13 Equally, interoperability is recognition of the Canadian
Navy’s own qualitative and quantitative limitations. Interoperability permits the
Canadian Navy to do more regarding both operations and the potential accrue-
ment of political credit, but it also ties the service closely to what its U.S. coun-
terpart does.14
The final rationale concerns the Canadian Navy’s self-preservation: there is
public appeal in confronting pirates. Though Somali pirates differ substantially
from the buccaneers of old or the swashbuckling figures of popular culture,
counterpiracy activities have an allure that the population easily appreciates.
This is no small issue, because historically the Canadian Navy has had difficul-
ties in promoting its relevance in terms of maintaining the nation’s security and
prosperity.15 If anything, this promotion has become more difficult in recent
years, for four reasons: the end of the Cold War brought a reduction in strategic
clarity; nontraditional threats, such as terrorism, are largely land-based phe-
nomena; considerable media attention has focused on the Canadian Army’s op-
erations in Afghanistan; and it is difficlt to espouse to domestic political
audiences measures of effectiveness that reveal the linkage between forward na-
val presence and globalization’s economic benefits.16 Thus, it is striking that
Commander Craig Baines, commanding officer of HMCS Winnipeg during its
counterpiracy mission, asserted that Canada’s efforts garnered “a level of na-
tional and international media interest ‘that is unprecedented in recent naval
operations.’” Equally surprising is that the media labeled Commander Baines a
“national celeb” as a result of his efforts and those of his crew in the waters off
Somalia.17
IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. CALL
Notwithstanding the importance Canada places on countering Somali piracy,
the American origins of the call for PSC/shipper engagement suggest a vacillat-
ing U.S. Navy approach. On the one hand, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has
justified an initial naval, rather than land-based, approach toward Somali piracy,
arguing that “[you] have to try to put out the fire before rebuilding the house.”18
More generally, American policies issued in 2005, 2007, and 2008 explicitly con-
nect freedom of the seas with countering piracy.19 In a congruent manner, the
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2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” identifies piracy as an
irregular and transnational threat. A U.S. Navy response to these threats, it de-
clares, “protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom
of navigation for the benefit of all nations.”20 Similarly, the current chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, asserted in the past that piracy
can “no longer be viewed as someone else’s problem. It is a global threat to secu-
rity because of its deepening ties to international criminal networks, smuggling
of hazardous cargoes, and disruption of vital commerce.”21
Yet on the other hand, the call for PSC/shipper engagement does imply limi-
tations on the degree to which piracy is to be a U.S. Navy problem. Certainly, that
service has not said that it is ending its counterpiracy work, nor has it suggested
that other states stop their own efforts. But one can argue that additional U.S.
Navy vessels, however necessary, will not be immediately forthcoming in coun-
tering Somali piracy.22
In this context, among the various transnational threats the U.S. Navy now
confronts, countering Somali piracy is apparently of a lower order of concern
than, for example, terrorism. As Jonathan Stevenson, of the faculty of the U.S. Na-
val War College, contends, “Most naval commanders do not consider the contain-
ment of the piracy problem a central military task, seeing it as a distraction from
core counterterrorism, counterproliferation, deterrence and war-fighting mis-
sions.”23 Though U.S. Navy officials are consistently wary of possible linkages be-
tween Somali pirates and Islamic extremists, there is no evidence to suggest the
two are connected.24 Until such a connection is clear, antipiracy efforts will seem-
ingly be a lesser priority for the U.S. Navy.
For Canada and its navy, the U.S. call for PSC/shipper engagement leads one
to question the nature of Canadian involvement in countering Somali piracy.
The Canadian Navy can still in the future show Canada’s international creden-
tials by “being there” in the Gulf of Aden, so garnering publicity at home. How-
ever, the ultimate success of a solely state-centric approach is minimized if
additional state naval resources, especially from the U.S. Navy, are not in theater.
Put differently, while the Canadian Navy can still assist the U.S. Navy in con-
fronting contemporary security threats that are of concern to Canada, Somali
piracy specifically is apparently on a lower level of importance for the U.S. Navy.
In the face of these issues, might Canada work to develop a better public/pri-
vate relationship beyond General Natynczyk’s demand that shippers be capable
at deterrence? Generally, such an approach, given Canada’s rationales for engag-
ing in counterpiracy efforts, might help to safeguard its interests at sea and sup-
port its interests by sea.25 Canadian activism would help compensate for the
quantitative limitations of a solely state-centric response at sea. It would also be
in keeping with the U.S. Navy’s desires to develop positive partnerships with sea
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users. These desires are evident in the 2005 “thousand-ship navy”/Global Mari-
time Partnership and the policy directives presented in the 2007 “Cooperative
Strategy,” noted above. Indeed, the language employed in these cooperative
frameworks is not exclusive to states.26
Therefore, to assess in what ways Canada might best advance the private pres-
ence as per the American call, the article now turns to the differences, vis-à-vis
state naval resources, of a PSC response and the possible drawbacks of the PSC
approach that require minimization.
Public/Private Differences
While warships of state navies off the Horn of Africa may convoy specific ships
of interest, they also patrol areas of water and intercept pirates. These are diffi-
cult tasks for state navies, given the Somali coastline’s size—the longest in main-
land Africa—and Somali pirates’ increasing brazenness and prowess. Somali
pirates, using mother ships to support smaller skiffs, have attacked vessels far-
ther than a thousand nautical miles from Somalia’s shores. The mother ships
provide for reach and the dispatched skiffs are stealthy and fast. Indeed, attacks
often end in less than fifteen minutes. Somali pirates have even mounted attacks
within the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor—in which shippers
and navies alike are to concentrate their resources—to the degree that the Gulf
of Aden has been nicknamed “pirate alley.”27
In light of these factors, state navies also emphasize reach and speed in coun-
tering Somali pirates. Canadian naval officers, such as Commander Baines, have
underlined the reach and swiftness of air assets: “It cannot be overstated how
critical Winnipeg’s embarked Sea King was to mission success. . . . The helicopter
was integral to every major piracy event that Winnipeg was involved in.”28 Com-
mander Waddell, of Fredericton, similarly stressed how state navies can stretch
their abilities: “It’s really huge geography. You don’t work side by side with other
ships. . . . You spread your resources out as best you can. You extend the range of
what you’re looking for by using radar, helicopters and patrol aircraft.”29
In contrast, PSCs largely avoid the coverage issues and the consequent capital
requirements by concentrating on the close protection of their clients’ vessels.30
As explained by one private security company, Hollowpoint Protective Services,
“vessels travelling in hostile waters require one on one protection. The seas are
much too vast for governments both foreign and domestic to protect every ship
that travels.”31
In exercising this close protection, PSCs are not under international law per-
mitted to “go after” and conduct offensive activities against Somali pirates. Arti-
cle 107 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
highlights state prerogative in this regard: “A seizure on account of piracy may
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be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized
to that effect.” What is more, only defensive measures are allowable, given
UNCLOS article 101’s definition of piracy as “any illegal acts of violence or de-
tention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft.” Indeed, taking action beyond
the mere defense of a client could itself constitute piracy.
In two particular ways, these legal limitations at sea fit well with how the
PSC industry has evolved generally. One pertains to the manpower rather than
capital-centric orientation of PSCs already evident in their operations on
land.32 At sea, whereas some PSCs do send their own vessels to sail alongside
clients’ ships, most instead offer only onboard security personnel, hired on a
contractual basis.33 Through this hiring method and by “equipping the man”
rather than “manning the equipment,” PSCs can avoid much of the adminis-
trative, management, investment, and infrastructure-related costs that state
militaries confront. This approach also, however, removes any opportunity for
a PSC to pursue and intercept pirates; a ship’s master retains control of the ves-
sel even if PSC personnel are on board.
The second way has to do with the carving out of a market niche for defensive
activities. States and PSCs alike are generally keen to conflate the offensive appli-
cation of violence with combat duties—that is, something that only states per-
form.34 In the view of both, private commercial actors who perform offensive
tasks are “mercenaries.” Indeed, American officials draw the distinction between
mercenaries and PSCs:
Accusations that U.S. government-contracted security guards, of whatever national-
ity, are mercenaries is inaccurate and demeaning to men and women who put their
lives on the line to protect people and facilities every day. . . . The security guards
working for U.S. government contractors in Iraq and elsewhere protect clearly de-
fined United States government areas, and their work is defensive in nature.35
In this vein, directives of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and the
Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan restrict combat duties and
law enforcement to state forces exclusively.36 One can note comparable offensive/
defensive distinctions made by British and Canadian officials. The “value
added” of PSC engagement comes through allowing militaries to concentrate
on combat-related tasks.37
Similarly, more and more firms utilize the term “private security company”
rather than “private military company,” so as to keep the “military” as the pre-
serve of states. This is also true for industry associations, such as the British As-
sociation of Private Security Companies, whose membership pledges “to avoid
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any armed exchange in their operations, except in self-defence.”38 Individual
companies also routinely espouse their defensive credentials.39
Another major difference between the public and the private is that PSCs
avoid the operational and legal challenges associated with bringing Somali pi-
rates to justice. Canadian Navy crews have let suspected pirates go rather than
face prosecution, a policy derided as “catch-and-release.”40 Several reasons in-
form this approach. Some relate to the navy’s human capital, as suggested by
Commodore Bob Davidson, who led Combined Task Force 150 in 2008: “We are
military people, not law-enforcement people. . . . We are not trained in evidence
gathering and the connection between crime and punishment.”41 Some prob-
lems relate to developing legal proxies in the region. For instance, only in 2010
did Canada initiate funding for special judicial venues in the Seychelles and
Kenya to prosecute captured pirate suspects.42 Other issues concern reluctance
to bring pirates to account in Canada: first, clear evidence of an attack, rather
than simply probable intent to attack, must be obtainable; second, no Canadians
are likely to be directly affected by a particular pirate attack; and third, prosecu-
tions in Canada might be ineffective and even lead to subsequent refugee
claims.43
It is true that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1816 “calls upon all . . .
States with relevant jurisdiction under international law and national legisla-
tion, to cooperate . . . in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible
for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.” The Security
Council has emphasized the resolution’s importance by renewing it twice
through UNSCR 1846 of 2 December 2008 and UNSCR 1897 of 30 November
2009. Nevertheless, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade argues that Canada is not obliged to respond: “The wording of paragraph
11 of UNSCR 1816 on ‘investigation and prosecution’ is not cast so as to create a
legally binding decision pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.”44 Whatever the legal merits—some Canadian Navy personnel have grum-
bled about the lack of “follow through”—this is a perplexing matter that PSCs
have not faced.45
Possible Drawbacks
Though the private presence enjoys some unique and useful attributes that states
and shippers alike might capitalize upon, PSC professionalism and capabilities are
unclear, given current industry dynamics. There is a fear that counterpiracy work
will become the next big PSC “gold rush,” with all the potential for disorder the
term evokes. Regarding the last “rush,” by some estimates 60 percent of private se-
curity companies did not exist before 11 September 2001; they found their places
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.46 Similarly, start-ups can increase the pressure
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for expansion into maritime operations, due to the small outlay required to get
into the business, given the aforementioned emphasis on contracted manpower.
Other, more established PSCs will also likely enter the maritime marketplace in
search of further opportunities and service diversification. As pointed out, for
instance, by Jim Cowling of the PSC Shipguard, “Iraq is being wound down, and
guys are looking around and latching onto piracy.”47
In many ways, the PSC expansion is occurring in a vacuum. Shippers, while
often knowledgeable of nonlethal security measures and tactics for countering
pirates, do not always have experience in managing violence; they must rely on
PSC expertise. PSCs themselves, however, have varying levels of experience in
maritime security. The ease of entering the marketplace has some qualitative
implications, as emphasized by Neptune Maritime Security’s David Rider:
“Ironically, hiring armed guards for a boat is easy. What’s difficult is hiring sea-
soned, experienced professionals at a competitive price who will ensure the se-
curity of not only the boat, its crew and cargo, but also the parent company’s
corporate reputation as well.”48 Disagreement among PSCs is also evident as to
whether unique characteristics and understandings are required regarding mar-
itime conditions, operations, and equipment, compared to security work on
land.49 Equally, some flag states have laws about the permissibility of arms
onboard but do not have regulations governing PSCs specifically.50
The potential for unmanaged growth and lack of control are troubling, be-
cause even with the hoped-for target-hardening and deterrent effect of PSC em-
ployment, it is likely that private violence will be increasingly applied. Indeed, it
has already happened: on 23 March 2010, in what has been termed as “the shot
‘heard round the seas,’” PSC personnel for the first time killed a pirate during a
thwarted attack on the MV Almezaan.51
CANADA AND REGULATION’S POTENTIAL ROLE
There is one international regulatory mechanism that might promote responsi-
ble and effective PSC/shipper engagement: the Montreux Document. Together,
the Swiss government and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) initiated the negotiations leading to the document. On 17 September
2008 Canada became one of the document’s first seventeen signatories. The
other states were Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, China, France, Ger-
many, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since September 2008, an addi-
tional seventeen states have announced their support for the document: Alba-
nia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Cyprus, Ecuador, Georgia, Greece, Italy,
Jordan, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Netherlands, Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Uganda,
and Uruguay.
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In the main, these states recognize the document’s two major contributions.
First, it identifies “hard” international humanitarian law and human-rights law
for states to follow. States are not immune from their international obligations
simply because PSCs are involved. Second, the document presents seventy-three
nonbinding “soft” standards—a tool kit of good practices—designed to guide
states in fulfilling their legal obligations.
The Montreux Document’s applicability to PSC maritime operations is
threefold. First, though the document emphasizes operations during armed
conflict, its drafters nevertheless espouse its broader applicability in peacetime
endeavors. In particular, they devised its good practices to be germane to the
wider development of responsible PSC employment independent of context. In-
deed, in their explanatory comments, the drafters explicitly identify the
Montreux Document’s practicality and usefulness regarding PSCs countering
piracy.52
Second, the document’s language is not overly limiting or exclusive. For in-
stance, the instrument focuses generally on firms providing services that “in-
clude, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such
as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons
systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security
personnel.”53 PSC counterpiracy activities can easily fall into these categories.
What is more, the document’s points on state jurisdiction are apt. It defines
“home states” as those in which a firm has “its principal place of management.”54
Many states that are document signatories are also the home states of private se-
curity companies offering counterpiracy services.55 Similarly, “territorial states”
are those states in which PSCs operate. The provisions can apply to flag states be-
cause of the sovereign responsibilities they are to exercise. As well, the drafters
champion the document’s applicability beyond relations between states and
PSCs: “The good practices may be of value for other entities such as interna-
tional organizations, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and compa-
nies.”56 Though only states can be signatories, the document’s guidance for
“contracting states” might be valuable for shippers that are PSC clients.
Third, acting on the good practices listed in the Montreux Document would
be beneficial in handling the qualitative concerns raised earlier. The good prac-
tices are ways in which state and nonstate actors can become savvy about the
PSC industry in terms of background checks, past activities, and performance
requirements. The document’s suggestions pertinent to quality control, person-
nel training, weapons systems operations, rules bearing on the use of force, and
standardization for the sake of upholding international humanitarian and
human-rights law are equally relevant to ensuring appropriate and effective
PSC activity. Similarly, the Montreux Document identifies the elements of
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international humanitarian and human-rights law that home states could in-
corporate into more general controls. These controls might be “corporate op-
erating licensing” for limited time spans, “specific operating licensing” for the
export of particular services, and “export authorization” that takes into ac-
count the proposed service, the client, and the operating context.57 Addition-
ally, the Montreux Document seeks to protect PSC employees themselves—that
is, it stresses employment standards and operational safety. States can identify
and underscore the particular requirements for the operations at sea of private
security companies, to the benefit of clients and PSC personnel alike.
Canada could work to promote the document’s applicability among states
(home and territorial/flag) and commercial shippers. To be sure, Canada was in-
strumental in pushing forward the three-year-long negotiations leading to the
document’s creation. The Department of National Defence is devising policies
on the selection, employment, and management of PSCs with the document
squarely in mind—making Canada one of the first countries to take this step.
What is more, Canadian advocacy would complement the efforts of the Swiss
government to disseminate the document’s good practices in forums like the
United Nations, NATO, the Organization of American States, and the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Such advocacy certainly would be
in line with the ICRC’s expectations that signatories actively promote the docu-
ment. In total, Canada could advance the document’s scope even beyond its
important humanitarian and human rights functions to cover PSC activities at
sea.
THE QUANTITATIVE CHALLENGE
One must recognize the challenge Canada and others who advocate the docu-
ment are likely to face: qualitative improvements in PSC/shipper relationships
may only lead to a limited increase in the quantitative level of these relation-
ships. From one standpoint, some shippers and industry associations are wary
about how having PSCs on board might lead to further violence, the deaths of
seafarers, and even environmental disaster. As suggested by Giles Noakes, the
head of maritime security at the Baltic International Maritime Council
(BIMCO), “While I understand the temptation, placing armed guards on board
creates a severe risk of escalation.”58 Measures undertaken by states to ensure the
capabilities and professionalism of PSCs might make the relationship called for
by the United States more appealing.
Yet from another standpoint, the very call for PSC/shipper engagement up-
sets long-held understandings about who should be doing what at sea. While
many shippers will take precautionary measures, they will draw the line at vio-
lence employed under their auspices. For them, only navies are to possess this
6 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWCR_Autumn2010-Spearin.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Thursday, August 19, 2010 1:25:50 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
11
Spearin: A Private Security Solution to Somali Piracy?—The U.S. Call for P
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
potential and, in turn, bring about a degree of order on the high seas. Peter
Hinchliffe, the International Chamber of Shipping’s marine director, sums up
this opposition:
I think what navies are forgetting, and perhaps governments are forgetting as well, is
that we are not talking about the protection of an individual ship in a piece of water.
What we are talking about is the fundamental obligation of nations to provide safe
passage for world trade. So, therefore, it is totally unsatisfactory for naval authorities
to try to devolve that responsibility to innocent merchant ships.59
In this regard, a number of other maritime-related organizations oppose the us-
age of armed PSC personnel: BIMCO, the International Association of Inde-
pendent Tanker Owners, the International Chamber of Shipping, the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum, the Society of International Gas
Tanker and Terminal Operators, the International Association of Dry Cargo
Ship Owners, the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, the
Cruise Lines International Association, the International Union of Marine In-
surers, the Joint War Committee and Joint Hull Committee, and the Interna-
tional Transport Workers Federation.60 Equally, the UN’s International
Maritime Organization and the International Maritime Bureau of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce are nonsupportive.
It would appear, therefore, that normative matters might easily impede the
ostensible functionality of security privatization. The upset resulting from secu-
rity privatization in whatever form is not surprising, according to Alyson Bailes:
“[The] rules, norms, disciplines, rewards and punishments have not been
tailored to fit this type of actor for a significant and habit-forming period of histori-
cal time. It is not the intrinsic ‘newness’ of the private sector and . . . transnational
actors that explains the difficulty; rather, it is the fact that they are different from
the recently dominant players.”61 All the same, unless a large number of shippers
embrace the U.S. call, the development of a critical mass of private security ac-
tivity will be constrained. Without this mass, the PSC presence will be limited in
how effectively it can counteract both the limitations of state naval activities and
the increasing assertiveness of Somali pirates. Hence, it is evident that increasing
the PSC presence to the point of creating a strong public/private partnership
against Somali piracy will be a longer-term undertaking.
{LINE-SPACE}
Commander Waddell summed up the state of Canada’s naval efforts in the wa-
ters off Somalia as HMCS Fredericton prepared to return home: “My view is that
the work is not complete here. . . . There will be a requirement, in my opinion, to
see further deployments here to sustain the effort.”62 The extent of Canada’s con-
cern and of its past engagement leads one to contend that the Canadian
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government will likely in the future decide to send naval resources to the Gulf of
Aden to further this “work.” This decision, however, must recognize that there is
now less certainty about the growth of U.S. Navy commitment. At the same time,
relations among states, private security companies, and shippers are in flux. The
Montreux Document is an appropriate vehicle through which Canada and
like-minded states can act in order to bring about qualitative improvements in
the PSC presence at sea. But building on the American call for PSC/shipper en-
gagement will be a challenging task. Despite the current state limitations, many
shippers prefer grey hulls on the distant horizon to PSC personnel on board.
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